Perry was Secretary of Defense in the Clinton Administration from 1994 to 1997.
1954-1964, William Perry headed Electronic Defense Laboratories, Inc.
1964-1977, he founded and was president of ESL Inc.
1977–1981, Perry served in the Carter Administration as Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering.
1981-1985, he was Executive Vice-president of Hambrecht & Quist.
1985-1993, founder and chairman of Technology Strategies and Alliances
Perry taught at Stanford University from 1988 until he entered the Clinton Administration in 1993, where he held the following positions:
where he obtained a conflict of interest waiver from then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin before greenlighting a new merger subsidy policy that would result in the Lockheed/Martin Marietta merger. This merger would land Martin Mariett's CEO Norman Augustine, Perry's former boss, a handsome $8.2 million bonus and fill the coffers of his company with $855 million in taxpayer monies . [For more on this see: Aspin]
In 2003 Perry sits on the board of Science Applications International Corp (SAIC). The Pentagon gave this company the job of assembling a team of Iraqi exiles to assist in restoring postwar Iraq. Its 'opportunities' have been expanded by the 'War on Terrorism'. Suspicions regarding its intentions, "... are fueled by the long list of former defense and intelligence officials who have worked for SAIC or served on its board, including defense secretaries Melvin R. Laird and William J. Perry, CIA directors John M. Deutch and Robert M. Gates, NSA director Bobby R. Inman."[1]
He is currently Senior Fellow at Hoover Institution.[2], serves on the board of Anteon International Corporation and is chairman of Global Technology Partners [an international defense contrator [3] . [4]
On anti-personnel electromagnetic weapons:
On 21 July 1994, Defense Secretary William J. Perry issued a memorandum on non-lethal weapons which outlined a tasking priority list for use of these technologies. Second on the list was "crowd control". Coming in at a poor fifth was "Disable or destroy weapons or weapon development/production processes, including suspected weapons of mass destruction." ... In July 1996, the Spotlight, a widely circulated right-wing U.S. newspaper, reported that well-placed DoD sources have confirmed a classified Pentagon contract for the development of "high-power electromagnetic generators that interfere with human brain waves." The article cited the memorandum of understanding dated 1994 between Attorney General Janet Reno, and Defense Secretary William Perry for transfer of LTL weapons to the law enforcement sector. A budget of under $50 million has been made available for funding associated "black" programs. Dr. Emery Horvath, a professor of physics at Harvard University, has stated in connection to the generator that interferes with human brain waves that "These electronic 'skull-zappers' are designed to invade the mind and short circuit its synapses... in the hands of government technicians, it may be used to disorient entire crowds, or to manipulate individuals into self destructive acts. It's a terrifying weapon." [5] [6] [7]
In July 1996, the Spotlight, a widely circulated right-wing U.S. newspaper, reported that well-placed DoD sources have confirmed a classified Pentagon contract for the development of "high-power electromagnetic generators that interfere with human brain waves." The article cited the memorandum of understanding dated 1994 between Attorney General Janet Reno, and Defense Secretary William Perry for transfer of LTL weapons to the law enforcement sector. A budget of under $50 million has been made available for funding associated "black" programs. Dr. Emery Horvath, a professor of physics at Harvard University, has stated in connection to the generator that interferes with human brain waves that "These electronic 'skull-zappers' are designed to invade the mind and short circuit its synapses... in the hands of government technicians, it may be used to disorient entire crowds, or to manipulate individuals into self destructive acts. It's a terrifying weapon." [5] [6] [7]
On U.S. air operations over Iraq:
Again after the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, then-U.S. Ambassador Wyche Fowler Jr. suggested it might be better to withdraw rather than see the American forces confined to a desert air base. But then-Secretary of Defense William J. Perry rejected the proposal, arguing it would make a continuation of U.S air operations over southern Iraq impossible. [8]
What is the difference between 'preventive defense' and 'pre-emptive strike'?
Perry has been codirector of the Preventive Defense Project at the Institute for International Studies since the late 1990s. The following is an excerpt from that project's website:
"Now that an immediate peril is not plainly visible, there is a natural tendency to relax and to return to business as usual. . . .But I feel that we are seriously failing in our attitude toward the international problems whose solution will largely determine our future." - George C. Marshall, Washington's Birthday Remarks at Princeton University, February 22, 1947 The Preventive Defense Project is a research collaboration of Stanford University and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, co-directed by William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter. Preventive Defense is a concept for American defense strategy in the post-Cold War era, premised on the belief that the absence of an imminent, major, traditional military threat to American security presents today's leaders with an unaccustomed challenge and opportunity to prevent future Cold War-scale threats to international security from emerging. While the U.S. defense establishment must continue to deter major regional conflicts and provide peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions when necessary, its highest priority is to contribute to forestalling developments that could directly threaten the survival and vital interests of American citizens. To this end, the Project focuses on forging productive security partnerships with Russia and its neighbors, engaging an emerging China, addressing the lethal legacy of Cold War weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and countering WMD proliferation and potential acts of catastrophic terrorism. ....[9]
"Now that an immediate peril is not plainly visible, there is a natural tendency to relax and to return to business as usual. . . .But I feel that we are seriously failing in our attitude toward the international problems whose solution will largely determine our future." - George C. Marshall, Washington's Birthday Remarks at Princeton University, February 22, 1947
The Preventive Defense Project is a research collaboration of Stanford University and Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, co-directed by William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter. Preventive Defense is a concept for American defense strategy in the post-Cold War era, premised on the belief that the absence of an imminent, major, traditional military threat to American security presents today's leaders with an unaccustomed challenge and opportunity to prevent future Cold War-scale threats to international security from emerging. While the U.S. defense establishment must continue to deter major regional conflicts and provide peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions when necessary, its highest priority is to contribute to forestalling developments that could directly threaten the survival and vital interests of American citizens.
To this end, the Project focuses on forging productive security partnerships with Russia and its neighbors, engaging an emerging China, addressing the lethal legacy of Cold War weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and countering WMD proliferation and potential acts of catastrophic terrorism. ....[9]
During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear holocaust hung over our heads like a dark cloud, the West prepared to meet an armored assault in Central Europe, and proxy wars flared all over the world. These daunting threats have gone away, but they have been replaced by new dangers. Nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists who -- unlike the nuclear powers during the Cold War -- might not be deterred by the threat of retaliation. - "Defense in an Age of Hope," William J. Perry (From Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996)[10]
[10]
The third major component of preventive defense answers another "what if" question: what if terrorists or rogue nations were to get their hands on nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, and use them against us? What if the terrorists who attacked the World Trade Center, instead of 2000 pounds of high explosives, had used a tactical nuclear bomb or nerve gas or anthrax? We know from what they told us that what they were trying to do was kill hundreds of thousands of people, but they didn’t have the right tools for doing that.[11]
Can we conclude, on the basis of the following review of a work that Perry coauthored in 1999 - "Preventive Defense. A New Security Strategy for America" [Carter, Ashton B. and William J. Perry (1999), Washington: Brookings] - that Perry would now, in the post-9/11 world, agree that the dangers he had foreseen had somehow been "mismanaged" by the U.S.?
The authors' preventive defense strategy concentrates on the dangers that, if mismanaged, have the potential to grow into true A-list threats to U.S. survival in the next century: These include .... "Loose Nukes": failure to reduce and secure the deadly legacy of the cold war--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in Russia and the rest of the former Soviet Union .... ; Proliferation: spread of weapons of mass destruction; and Catastrophic Terrorism: increase in the scope and intensity of transnational terrorism.[12] [This work can be found here. Search on preventive defense]
In other words, in speaking of 'preventive defense' are we to lay emphasis on genuine prevention or on the perceived threat imposed by 'rogue states' and 'terrorists'?
The discussion was moderated by former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor with a joint appointment in the Management Science and Engineering Department and the Stanford Institute for International Studies. Speaking briefly at the outset, Perry asserted that the greatest threat to world peace is the continuing development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states and terrorists. [See Chomsky on the US as Rogue State.] Michael McFaul, an associate professor of political science and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, agreed. "But in my mind," he added, " the only way we'll really make our world safer is when we eliminate the motivations for acquiring those weapons of mass destruction -- when we eliminate the things that motivate people to get into planes and fly them into the World Trade Center." Security "is not simply a matter of defending ourselves against weapons that might harm us," McFaul said. "It's about making the outside world a better, more prosperous and free place." [14]
Michael McFaul, an associate professor of political science and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, agreed. "But in my mind," he added, " the only way we'll really make our world safer is when we eliminate the motivations for acquiring those weapons of mass destruction -- when we eliminate the things that motivate people to get into planes and fly them into the World Trade Center." Security "is not simply a matter of defending ourselves against weapons that might harm us," McFaul said. "It's about making the outside world a better, more prosperous and free place." [14]
An authentic policy of 'preventive defense' is one that will intentionally forego the use of military force that is pre-emptive or preventive (i.e., unprovoked) in favor of the development of effective conflict resolution processes that are capable of addressing real international grievances. In 1946, at the beginning of the Cold War, Lewis Mumford suggested [13] that there could be NO insurance against a nuclear attack on the U.S. short of genuine international cooperation of this sort. He convincingly argued that not even a 'preventive' nuclear first-strike by the U.S. (against Russia, the presumed enemy at that time) could be expected to effectively preclude the use of nuclear weapons against the U.S., and/or their proliferation in the aftermath of such a war.
To his credit, Perry seems to have recently adopted a new approach. He has put away the red flag of terrorism that he, as part of Bush's foreign-policy parade, has been waving in the public's face. His attention has turned to admonishing the President. In a piece entitled Not Negotiating is Not a Solution (July 24, 2003) Perry states, "The Bush Administration has refused to negotiate with North Korea. The strategy underlying this approach is not clear, but the consequences are all too clear."[14]
Someone should point Perry in the direction of the 2000 PNAC document, which sheds ample light on the strategies underwriting current foreign policy decisions.
If what one wants to do is legitimize wars that are undertaken for the purpose of strategic occupation of foreign lands in a game of global dominance - Hitler knew this, and acted accordingly - one must either rationalize invasion as a form of assistance to the victim country (e.g., 'nation-building') or be able to justify such invasions by construing at least some of those under attack as 'enemies', who must be removed. And if there are many lands that are calling out for occupation, there will be need for an endless stream of enemies. How can that need be satisfied? Well, to paraphrase Abraham Maslow, " When the only tool you have in your foreign policy toolbox is a bomb, everyone starts to look like an enemy ". There is method in the madness of being a one-trick president.
