George C. Marshall websearch @ GOOGLE indypress @ GOOGLE booklist @ NAMEBASE socialmap @ NAMEBASE Marshall was Defense Secretary in the Truman Administration from 1950 to 1951.

1939 to 1945, George Marshall served as Army Chief of Staff in the FDR Administration, "building and directing the largest army in history".

1947-49, he was Secretary of State in the Truman Administration.

The records show that two weeks before Pearl Harbor a White House conference anticipated a war and discussed how it should be justified, writes Howard Zinn. Here is one account of what happened:

On November 25, 1941, U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull gave the Japanese an ultimatum demanding that they evacuate Indochina and China and recognize U.S. ally General Chiang Kai-shek as the only legitimate government in China. They knew the Japanese would not comply.

That evening Secretary of War Stimson recorded in his diary: "[The President] brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps next Monday, for the Japanese were notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. This was a difficult proposition."

The next day, the army chief of staff, George C. Marshall, sent the following cable to the commanding general in Hawaii: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the task assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." [3]

In 1941, before Pearl Harbor and thus before any U.S. casualties were suffered in WWII, Marshall called for the planning of "general incendiary attacks to burn up the wood and paper structures of the densely populated Japanese cities." [4]

Acting upon General George C. Marshall's 1941 idea of torching the poorer areas of Japan's cities, on the night of March 9-10, 1945, LeMay's bombers laid siege on Tokyo. Tightly packed wooden buildings were assaulted by 1,665 tons of incendiaries. LeMay later recalled that a few explosives had been mixed in with the incendiaries to demoralize firefighters (96 fire engines burned to ashes and 88 firemen died). ... It is believed that more people died from fire in a six-hour time period than ever before in the history of mankind.

By May 1945, 75 percent of the bombs being dropped on Japan were incendiaries. Cheered on by the likes of Time Magazine- which explained that "properly kindled, Japanese cities will burn like autumn leaves" - LeMay's campaign took an estimated 672,000 lives. ... a spokesman for the Fifth Air Force categorized "the entire population of Japan [as] a proper military target." [5]

Now that an immediate peril is not plainly visible, there is a natural tendency to relax and to return to business as usual... But I feel that we are seriously failing in our attitude toward the international problems whose solution will largely determine our future. - George C. Marshall, February 22, 1947 Whose fancy does that quote tickle today? Find out here: [1] For more on this, see William Perry, Defense Secretary under Clinton.

Howard Zinn on the 'Marshall Plan':

Meanwhile, the United States, giving economic aid to certain countries, was creating a network of American corporate control over the globe, and building its political influence over the countries it aided. The Marshall Plan of 1948, which gave $16 billion in economic aid to Western European countries in four years, had an economic aim: to build up markets ... From 1952 on, foreign aid was more and more obviously designed to build up military power in non-Communist countries...

The Marshall Plan also had a political motive. The Communist parties of Italy and France were strong, and the United States decided to use pressure and money to keep Communists out of the cabinets of those countries. When the Plan was beginning, Truman's Secretary of State Dean Acheson said: "These measures of relief and reconstruction have been only in part suggested by humanitarianism. Your Congress has authorized and your Government is carrying out, a policy of relief and reconstruction today chiefly as a matter of national self-interest." [6]

The Pentagon's George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies - situated in the German town of Garmisch, and run jointly by the U.S. and German governments - was created in 1992 by then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. It has recently come under criticism: [7]

On the Pacific War:

The Pacific War had its roots in the Great Depression. The colonial powers had responded to the economic crisis by imposing high protective tariffs around their empires, to the benefit of their own firms. Washington placed the huge U.S. market behind the Smoot-Hawley tariff and maintained special preferences for its own business interests in the Philippines and Cuba. "All over the world," a State Department official noted, "various obstacles to the free and natural flow of Japanese exports" had been raised. Given this situation, it is not surprising that Japan sought to emulate the other colonial powers and establish a self-sufficient economic empire of its own, which meant expansion into China. To U.S. officials, the United States was entitled to its Monroe Doctrine for Latin America, but the Japanese could not have their Monroe Doctrine for Asia. This inevitably led to a clash between Tokyo and Washington, but it was a war not for freedom, but to determine who would dominate Asia.

The goals of the war were clearly revealed at the fighting's end. The United States took over a vast network of Pacific islands as strategic bases without the consent of their inhabitants.

... In 1965 Gar Alperovitz wrote Atomic Diplomacy, the first full-length study to advance the thesis that the bombs were dropped in order to intimidate the Soviet Union. Now, together with a team of researchers, he has written The Decision To Use the Atomic Bomb, in which he argues that the modern evidence not only sustains but reinforces his position. [8]