Louis Johnson was Secretary of Defense in the Truman Administration from 1949 to 1950.
In the same year, Johnson issued a directive creating the Armed Forces Security Agency. Its mission was to conduct intelligence and security activities for the military. [1]
During Johnson's tenure as Secretary of Defense, the National Security Act of 1947 was amended, centralizing power in the Secretary of Defense and giving him a larger staff in an organization renamed the Department of Defense. The re-organization and centralization of power in the Secretary of caused friction and resignations; a report was issued criticizing Johnson for failing to "follow the advice" of the Joint Chiefs.[2]
June, 1950: Truman, Louis Johnson, and Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson decide to commit U.S. ground forces to battle in Korea.[2]
Here is the U.S. Army's account of the process behind that decision:
The most sensible course seemed to be a co-operative effort among members of the United Nations to halt the aggression. But South Korea needed help at once; and the United Nations could hardly act swiftly enough. Furthermore, communist members of the United Nations could be expected to oppose joint action. President Truman and his key advisers gathered at the Blair House in Washington on the evening of 25 June for an exchange of views. Five State Department members, the Secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chief of Staff were present. At this meeting, the policy-makers discussed the major problems facing the United States in the Far East. Foremost in their minds was a consideration of Soviet intentions and American capabilities. Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense, believed strongly that Formosa was more vital to the security of the United States than Korea, and at his direction General Omar N. Bradley, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, read a memorandum on Formosa prepared by General MacArthur. At the insistence of Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, questions of Formosa were postponed temporarily, and the attention of the group was redirected to Korea. Acheson recommended that General MacArthur furnish supplies and ammunition to the ROK at once and that he be directed to evacuate U.S. nationals by any means required... ... General Bradley summed up the prevailing opinion. He said that the United States would have to draw the line on communist aggression somewhere-and that somewhere was Korea. ...The commitment of air and naval units to Korea established a precedent for the later commitment of U. S. ground troops. It was done without sanction of or reference to the United Nations ...[3]
President Truman and his key advisers gathered at the Blair House in Washington on the evening of 25 June for an exchange of views. Five State Department members, the Secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chief of Staff were present.
At this meeting, the policy-makers discussed the major problems facing the United States in the Far East. Foremost in their minds was a consideration of Soviet intentions and American capabilities. Louis A. Johnson, Secretary of Defense, believed strongly that Formosa was more vital to the security of the United States than Korea, and at his direction General Omar N. Bradley, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, read a memorandum on Formosa prepared by General MacArthur. At the insistence of Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, questions of Formosa were postponed temporarily, and the attention of the group was redirected to Korea. Acheson recommended that General MacArthur furnish supplies and ammunition to the ROK at once and that he be directed to evacuate U.S. nationals by any means required...
... General Bradley summed up the prevailing opinion. He said that the United States would have to draw the line on communist aggression somewhere-and that somewhere was Korea.
...The commitment of air and naval units to Korea established a precedent for the later commitment of U. S. ground troops. It was done without sanction of or reference to the United Nations ...[3]
The Korean War was a 'different kind' of war:
It was an undeclared war, a "police action" that triggered a national emergency and a military buildup. The American military fought the war under restrictions-the first major American war, as one historian observed, that was not fought as a crusade. The conflict resulted in the firing of an American Secretary of Defense; the relief of a popular and powerful military commander; brought into military usage the term "limited war"; and produced the "never again" school of US officers, military leaders, and governmental officials committed to the proposition that the US should not ever again become embroiled in a land war in Asia. [4]
On Louis Johnson and covert operations:
In 1949, the then-Secretary of Defense, a man named Louis Johnson, wrote a very important paper with respect to covert operations. He said that the Department of Defense would fully support the CIA in any of its approved covert operations, provided that the CIA would reimburse the Department of Defense for all `out-of-pocket' costs. They wouldn't have to reimburse for the purchase price of an aircraft because the Air Force had already spent that money. But they would have to reimburse for the cost of operating that aircraft, for the cost of any other facilities required, and even for the salaries of crews that were assigned to that aircraft over a period of time. This philosophy of reimbursement is very important in covert operations because it keeps bills from appearing in public that would stir up questions about why this money spent was when it wasn't spent for the line items in the budget. ... Within a few years, the Agency was able to point out to Congress that a lot of money was flowing in that channel because, effectively, they were paying for the utilization of very high cost equipment: aircraft, submarines, even aircraft carriers in a few places. Very expensive things to operate on a reimbursable basis. So based on that, the agency began to get a much larger budget. Then when they went into the U-2 and the space programs that budget grew considerably. And it was a completely classified budget and almost non-accountable ... As a result, because of the law of 1949 which permitted this activity, and the letter from Secretary Louis Johnson - the policy statement that we would carry out all our work on a reimbursable basis with other departments and agencies of the government then following that procedure - the Agency was allocated considerable amounts of money after 1949 and it was under their own control. [4] [For more on this see Kennedy Administration]
This philosophy of reimbursement is very important in covert operations because it keeps bills from appearing in public that would stir up questions about why this money spent was when it wasn't spent for the line items in the budget. ... Within a few years, the Agency was able to point out to Congress that a lot of money was flowing in that channel because, effectively, they were paying for the utilization of very high cost equipment: aircraft, submarines, even aircraft carriers in a few places. Very expensive things to operate on a reimbursable basis. So based on that, the agency began to get a much larger budget.
Then when they went into the U-2 and the space programs that budget grew considerably. And it was a completely classified budget and almost non-accountable ... As a result, because of the law of 1949 which permitted this activity, and the letter from Secretary Louis Johnson - the policy statement that we would carry out all our work on a reimbursable basis with other departments and agencies of the government then following that procedure - the Agency was allocated considerable amounts of money after 1949 and it was under their own control. [4] [For more on this see Kennedy Administration]
Truman requested Johnson's resignation in September of 1950, and later referred to him as an 'egomaniac'. But there was more underlying this decision than personality differences. Johnson was forced out during the course of the Acheson-Nitze takeover of Truman foreign policy. [Follow thread1.] Johnson was replaced by retired general George C. Marshall, previously Secretary of State in the Truman Administration. [5]. Robert Lovett was made his assistant, and would eventually replace Marshall.
