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under John F. Kennedy 1961-63
Democracy is good; but can one have too much of a good thing, no? Policy makers in the Kennedy administration thought so. Chomsky explains:
Another problem that's pointed to over and over again in these [U.S. government] secret documents is the excessive liberalism of Third World countries. (That was particularly a problem in Latin America, where the governments weren't sufficiently committed to thought control and restrictions on travel, and where the legal systems were so deficient that they required evidence for the prosecution of crimes.) The need to contain democratic 'excesses' was a theme echoed more than twenty years later in a report issued in 1973 by the newly-created ' Trilateral Commission', a neoliberal think tank. The report was called ' The Crisis of Democracy' (1973) [for more about about the 'crisis', see the Carter Administration]. Here is how this concept was applied to FOREIGN policy during the Kennedy administration:
The Commission's report is concerned with the "governability of the democracies." Its American author, Samuel Huntington, was former chairman of the Department of Government at Harvard, and a government adviser. He is well-known for his ideas on how to destroy the rural revolution in Vietnam. He wrote in Foreign Affairs (1968) that "In an absent-minded way the United States in Vietnam may well have stumbled upon the answer to 'wars of national liberation.' " The answer is "forced-draft urbanization and modernization." Explaining this concept, he observes that if direct application of military force in the countryside "takes place on such a massive scale as to produce a massive migration from countryside to city" then the "Maoist-inspired rural revolution may be "undercut by the American-sponsored urban revolution." The Viet Cong, he wrote, is "a powerful force which cannot be dislodged from its constituency so long as the constituency continues to exist."Dean Rusk, Secretary of State under Kennedy and Johnson, was one of the first to sound the warning about Communist advances in Southeast Asia. He was Deputy Secretary of State at the time, and in the grip of the newly established Cold War policy of 'Military Containment': Dean Rusk, who would later prosecute the [Vietnam] war to its fullest as Secretary of State in the Kennedy-Johnson years - and, later still, become a member of CPD-II [the Committee on the Present Danger, reconstituted in the Reagan years] - wrote the following memorandum in the spring of 1950 while acting as Deputy Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs [in the Truman Administration]: "The Department of State continues to hold that Southeast Asia is in grave danger of Communist domination ....[and] the resources of the United States should be deployed to reserve Indo-China and Southeast Asia from further Communist encroachment. - Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983), page 125. The Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine extended 'containment' policy to Asia. It was Maxwell Taylor (later, an influential adviser to Kennedy) who would articulate a policy of 'flexible response' as early as 1956. It would continue to develop within the ranks of the establishment elite, where it would finally find voice in Henry Kissinger: It was given a considerable boost by the publication of Henry Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy in 1957. Kissiner's book was the outgrowth of a Council on Foreign Relations and Rockefeller-sponsored study over which he served as executive director. As Kissinger described the deliberations of the group, they were, in parallel fashion to Taylor, searching for flexibility in the use of nuclear weaponry in a manner short of the massive dosage prescribed in the Dulles doctrine [under Eisenhower] Nitze, who by this early date has already raised the issue of tactical nuclear weapons for limited theater use, was one of the many Cold War luminaries who sat on the panel. - Jerry Sanders, Peddlers of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of Containment (Boston, MA: South End Press, 1983), page 126. Fancy names were devised for the strategies they used to hide the brute fact of the political trickery about which Chomsky speaks in the passage above: 'plausible deniability', for example. Lying has always played a role in promoting U.S. military objectives. But it was the Wilson Administration in particular that attracted Hitler's admiration by pioneering State Propaganda. The entire Cold War period that followed, founded on what was in effect a forty year lie, developed increasingly sophisticated strategies for bolstering that Lie, by blurring the line between reality and fiction. The modus operandi of the Intelligence Community is no longer, as the media would have us believe, the simple 'gathering of intelligence', if ideed it ever was. It is, rather, the profound manipulation - for political purposes - of reality. Its purpose is the creation of a Virtual (Political) Reality, and the means it uses to do this is 'covert operations' of a very sophisticated sort - an activity more akin to active and agressive Paradigm Shifting than to the gathering of information/intelligence. The Eisenhower and Nixon administrations utilized information distribution techniques (e.g., disinformation campaigns) and applied them to domestic situations (in Cointelpro, for example). The Ronald Reagan Administration perfected methods for neutralizing the press at home and making covert action fiscally profitable abroad (The Enterprise). The George HW Bush Administration ultized Press Blackouts and a reporter Pool System in the first Gulf War. George W Bush's experiment with Embedded Reporters is a subtler and more powerful manipulation of the press during wartime, a branch of Psy-Ops (Psychological Operations designed to plant clusters of mutually-supporting fictions in the press, aimed at influencing public opinion and policy-makers).
Many of these strategies of deception are made possible through the infiltration of research organizations, the media and other types of business by the CIA. The CIA plants in these organizations are then used as springboards for selected covert operations. This strategy derives orginally from Allen Dulles's idea of 'moving [covert operators] up and further into their cover'. [3]
When we put them in other departments and agencies, they might be somebody's assistant. Then they've been there for three years and the man who was above them, who was probably a political appointee, leaves. That agency might move this man up. Or when a newer political appointee comes, he has no knowledge that this man is really from CIA. He's just a strong person in his office and he gives him a broader role. For example: From 1950 until the exposure of the CIA's penetration of domestic foundations in the mid-1960s, the Congress for Cultural Freedom spawned international seminars, regional programs, and about two dozen cultural, literary, and political magazines throughout the Western world (the flagship was England's "Encounter"). Many leading intellectuals were involved: Sidney Hook, Arthur Koestler, Melvin J. Lasky, Irving Kristol, Dwight Macdonald, Daniel Bell, Edward Shils, and Ignazio Silone. After CIA funding ended in 1967 the Ford Foundation tried to take up the slack, but CCF was never quite able to recover from the embarrassment.[5] A restructuring of the U.S. government took place in the early years of the Cold War. It brought
The men behind this restructuring - Lovett, Harriman, and others - were waiting in the wings when John Kennedy took the reins of power from republican president Dwight Eisenhower. Kennedy asked Robert Lovett (Defense Secretary in the Truman Administration, Prescott Bush's associate in Brown Brothers Harriman, and chair of the 1946 'Lovett Committee' out of which was born the Cold War and the CIA), to be his Defense Secretary. Lovett declined, but nevertheless wound up playing a tremendously influential role in hand-picking members of the Kennedy Administration. [See: Robert Lovett]
In addition, from the Eisenhower Administration Kennedy inherited CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Lyman Lemnitzer. About Lemnitzer: By now, many are familiar with Operation Northwoods, the U.S. plan to wage terrorist attacks against American citizens and blame Fidel Castro as a pretext for war. "We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba", the document read. "Casualty lists in U.S. newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation," it continued. Developed through the far-right stewardship of General Lyman L. Lemnitzer [Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, under Kennedy] in an early '60s atmosphere of anti-Communist paranoia, Operation Northwoods was approved by all Joint Chiefs of Staff, but nixed by the civilian leadership.
Some suspect that 9/11 was another 'Operation Northwoods': In their 1963 book, The Far Right, Donald Janson and Bernard Eismann exposed similar dangers. "Concern had grown that a belligerent and free-wheeling military could conceivably become dangerous to the stability of the United States as the mixture of rebelliousness and politics had in nations forced to succumb to juntas or fascism," they wrote. But though the far right remained frustrated in the 1960s, it's as if their dream has been fulfilled today, with Dick Cheney, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and other Project for a New American Century (PNAC) think tankers filling in for Lemnitzer et al and PNAC's "catastrophic and catalyzing event - like a new Pearl Harbor" taking Operation Northwoods' place. On the eve of September 11, Bush verified PNAC's prophecy, dictating into his diary, as Bob Woodward noted in Bush at War, that "The Pearl Harbor of the 21st Century took place today" and interjecting that "[t]his was a war in which people were going to have to die." [8] Current Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who signed the 1997 'statement of principles' on which PNAC was founded, also recently came up with the notion of a Proactive, Preemptive Operations Group (P2OG)', the sole purpose of which would be to 'stimulate' terrorists into action. See: Rumsfeld.
More about the similarities between Operation Northwood and 9/11 : James Bamford, formerly Washington Investigative Producer for ABC's World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, and who has written investigative cover stories for the New York Times Magazine, the Washington Post Magazine, and the Los Angeles Times Magazine, describes an operation which suggests that even the U.S. armed forces may be suspect.
A similarly rapid increase in military spending occured under Kennedy. It, also, was based on what historian Howard Zinn calls 'invented scares': In 1960, the military budget was $45.8 billion--9.7 percent of the budget. That year John F. Kennedy was elected President, and he immediately moved to increase military spending. In fourteen months, the Kennedy administration added $9 billion to defense funds, according to Edgar Bottome (The Balance of Terror). During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy assembled a group to advise him: Kennedy assembled a small group that came to be called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council - or ExComm for short. ... Included in the ExComm were the regular participants in National Security Council meetings, plus Kennedy's brother, the attorney general Robert Kennedy, and the President's chief speechwriter, the White House counsel Theodore Sorensen. Both of these men could help Kennedy to think about the domestic political aspects of the crisis. The President also invited several other key advisors to join the group: C Douglas Dillon, who had held high posts under Eisenhower and who gave Kennedy a link to the Republican leadership; Dean Acheson and Robert [A] Lovett, who had served under President Harry Truman and could help Kennedy see the current crisis in longer historical perspective; and a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn (Tommy) Thompson, probably the person in the President's circle who was best acquainted with Khrushchev. [11]Hawks like Paul Nitze pushed for tough action. [12] Kennedy created the Taylor Commission to ascertain the reasons for the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Their report found ... ... that the CIA, at White House direction, had organized and trained Cuban exiles to enter Cuba, foment anti-Castro sentiment, and ultimately overthrow the Cuban government. Originally intended by the Eisenhower Administration as a guerrilla operation, Zapata was supposed to operate within the parameters of NSC Directive 5412, that called in part for plausible U.S. deniability. However, in the Kennedy Administration, the operation grew in size and scope to include a full-scale military invasion ... Michael Forrestal, the son of James Forrestal, the man who had been first U.S. Secretary of Defense (under Truman) played a role in the Kennedy Administration: Kennedy chose a moment when the Secretaries of State and Defense and the CIA director were all out of Washington to launch his coup against Diem with the famous Cable of August 24 (the key document in the Pentagon Papers) to Lodge, and the responsible Cabinet officials all had subordinates sign off on the cable for them, so the coup in popular media lore came to be blamed on George Ball, Michael Forrestal, Averell Harriman, and Roger Hilsman, not on Kennedy.It appears that Joseph Kennedy, father of John Kennedy, was a friend of James Forrestal: [JFK's] dad, a big donor to FDR and friend of Navy Secretary James Forrestal, got him into the Navy without a physicial examination, which he could not pass, going directly into Naval intelligence in Washington D.C. as an ensign after having been drafted and rejected for the Army. [15] The Rest of the Iceberg
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